What is History? A Response to Historical Relativism, Part 2

Note: This is part two of the article posted from last week.

Response to the Metaphysical (Worldview) Objections

While every historian has a worldview through which he interprets events, this reality alone does not render objective history impossible.

Response to the Problem of Arranging Materials

The past is not distorted simply because the historian must arrange his materials. Since neither the historian or the geologist was present for the original events, it is necessary to reconstruct the past based upon the available evidence. However, reconstruction does not automatically equate with revision. It is true that every historian needs to arrange his material, but this can occur without neglecting significant matters. As long as the historian incorporated consistently and comprehensively all the significant events in accordance with the way things really were, then objectivity would be lost.(1) Objectivity is distorted when facts are either neglected or twisted on purpose by the historian. Simply arranging materials does not undermine objectivity assuming it is done honestly.

Response to the Problem of Structuring Materials

"Those who argue against the objectivity of history apart from an overall worldview must be granted the point, for without a worldview it makes no sense to talk about objective meaning."(2) Without a context meaning cannot be determined, and context is provided by the worldview and not the mere facts themselves. All of this points to the necessity of establishing a worldview in order to achieve objectivity. Without a metaphysical structure, one is simply arguing in a circle regarding the assumed causal connection and the attributed importance of events.(3) To assert that facts have internal arrangement begs the question, "How does one know the correct arrangement?"

As we have already seen, since historical facts can be arranged in at least three ways (chaotic, cyclical, and linear), it is fallacious to assume that one of these structures is the way the facts should be arranged without the aid of an overriding worldview. Consequently, objective meaning in history cannot be established without appealing to a particular worldview for guidance.(4) If facts alone could produce objectivity the best they could do is provide only the what of history. But objective meaning deals with the why of these events, which is impossible apart from a structure of meaning in which the facts may find significance. Dr. Norman Geisler offers the following proof that objective meaning apart from worldview is impossible:

Nevertheless, granted that there is justification for adopting a theistic worldview, the objective meaning of history become possible, for within the theistic context each fact of history become a theistic fact. Given the factual order of events and the known causal connection of events, the possibility of objective meaning surfaces. The chaotic and cyclical frameworks are eliminated in favor of the linear, and within the linear view of events causal connections emerge as the result of their context in a theistic universe. Theism provides the sketch on which history paints the complete picture. The pigments of mere fact take on real meaning as they are blended together on the theistic sketch. In this context, objectivity means systematic consistency; that is, the most meaningful way all the facts of history can be blended together into the whole theistic sketch is what really happened—historical facts.(5)

Response to the Problem of Miracles

Despite having proven that objective history is possible, many historians object to any history that contains miracles, which is a problem for the Christian view of history. The famous skeptic David Hume wrote that no testimony about alleged miracles should be accepted if it contradicts the uniform testimony of nature.(6) If one defines a miracle as a special act of God, and God does exist, than miracles are possible. Therefore, any alleged historical paradigm that excludes miracles is faulty.(7) Second, Hume's assessment assumes a naturalistic interpretation of all historical events. Hume's is a methodological exclusion of the possibility of accepting miracles in history which in the end reaches too far.(8) According to Richard Whately, Hume's uniform dismissal of the possibility of miracles not only excludes the possibility of miracles but any unusual events from the past.(9)

For the purpose of illustration, consider the following regarding the career of Napoleon Bonaparte. There can be little doubt that the odds against Napoleon's success were extremely high:

His prodigious army was destroyed in Russia, and a few months later he led a different army in Germany that likewise was ruined at Leipzig. However, the French supplied him with yet another army sufficient to make a formidable stand in France—this was repeated five times until at last he was confined to an island.(10)

While no one doubts that this chain of events is highly improbable, there is no compelling reason to doubt the historicity of Napoleon's exploits. Contrary to scientific demands, history is not dependent upon universal and repeatable experimentation. Rather it stands on the sufficiency of good testimony for unrepeatable events. Likewise with miracles, it is an unjustifiable mistake in historical methodology to assume that no unusual and particular event can be believed no matter how great the evidence for it. An honest historian must be open to the possibility of unique and particular events in the past whether they are miracouls or not.(11)

While God is not currently working miracles during the Dispensation of Grace, miracles have happened in history but are not the result of history. This reality is consistent with a theistic worldview and does not subvert historical objectivity.

Response to the Psychological Objection

Critics of the New Testament constantly assert that the religious motivations of the Gospel writers cancel their ability to present an objective historical report. As we saw previously, the gospel writers are routinely accused of creating the words of Jesus in their own terms rather than simply reporting them. Dr. Geisler offers the following ten reasons for why this assertion is without foundation:

First, there is no logical connection between one's purpose and the accuracy of the history he writes. People with no religious motives can write bad history, and people with religious motives can write good history.

Second, other important writers from the ancient world wrote with motives similar to the Gospel authors. Plutarch (46 A.D.), for example declared, "My design was not to write histories, but lives."

Third, complete religious propaganda literature, such as some critics see the New Testament, was actually unknown in the ancient world.

Fourth, unlike other early accounts, the Gospels were written, at a maximum, only decades after the events. Many other secular writings, such as those of Livy (59/64 B.C.-A.D. 17) and Plutarch, were recorded centuries after the events.

Fifth, as shown above, the historical confirmation of New Testament writings is overwhelming. So the argument that their religious purpose destroyed their ability to write good history is simply contrary to the facts.

Sixth, the New Testament writes take great care to distinguish there words from the words of Christ. . . This act of distinguishing reveals their honest attempt to separate what Jesus actually said form their own thoughts and feelings on the mater.

Seventh, in spite of the religious purpose of Luke's gospel (Luke 1:4, Acts 1:1), he states a clear interest for historical accuracy, which has been overwhelming corroborated by archaeology (see Luke 1:1-4).

Eighth, the existence of religious bias is no guarantee of historical inaccuracy. A writer can recognize his own bias and avoid its crippling effects. If this were not so, then even people with nonreligious (or anit-religious) biases could not write accurate history.

Ninth, the New Testament is confirmed to be historical by the same criteria applied to other ancient writings. Thus, this criticism either misses the mark or else it destroys all ancient histories.

Tenth, if the historicity of an event must be denied because of the strong motivation of the person giving it, then virtually all eyewitness testimony from survivors of the holocaust must be discounted. But this is absurd, since these people provide the best evidence of all. Likewise, a physician's passion to save his patient's life does not negate his ability to make an objective diagnosis of his disease, nor do an author's religious motives nullify his ability to record accurate history.(12)

Response to the Hermeneutical Objection

There are several basic reasons why this argument completely fails to demonstrate that objective history is not possible.

The Relativity Argument Presupposes Some Objective Knowledge

There is a big difference between arguing about the interpretation of historical facts and quit asserting that there are no historical facts to argue about. Historical relativists presuppose objective knowledge while arguing that objective knowledge does not exist. First, in speaking about the need to select and arrange the facts of history, subjectivists imply that the facts represent objective knowledge in and of themselves.(13) Second, "the very fact that relativist believe one's worldview can distort how one views history implies that there is a correct way to view it."(14)

Total Historical Relativity is Self-Defeating

How does one know that history is completely unknowable without claiming to know something about it? How could one know that all historical knowledge was relative without possessing some objective knowledge of it? Having seen the logical end of relativism, some historians have hedged slightly by arguing that history is only partially relative. Once one opens the door to even partial objectivity, one cannot claim to have eliminated in principle the possibility that the Christian claims are historically knowable.(15) Moreover, partial relativism does not eliminate the historical verifiability of Christianity since there is more evidence for the central truths of Christianity than for almost any other event from the ancient world. In summation, total historical relativism is self-defeating, and partial historical relativism admits verifiable truths.(16)

Conclusion

The details of many other arguments against historical relativism could also be cited, but the core of these positions has already been examined and found wanting. These arguments include the following: historical relativists attempt objective history themselves, an ability to recognize bad history implies objective knowledge, and historians employ normal objective standards. Some may be wondering why we went through all the trouble to outline and respond to objections against the objectivity of history. Believers must always remember that Christianity is a historical faith that is built upon the historicity of Christ's life, ministry, crucifixion, and resurrection. As we said in the article entitled, The Importance of History to the Christian Worldview, our faith rises or falls based upon the historicity of the New Testament documents. As believers we need to be prepared to give a defense when our faith is skeptically challenged. We ought not to allow those who would reject the knowablity of history to thwart the defense and confirmation of the gospel. While charges of myth are often levied against the Christian view of history, these charges need not trip believers up. As we have demonstrated, history can be as objective as science.

Endnotes:

1) Norman Geisler. Systematic Theology: Volume One. (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany House, 2002), 194.

2) Ibid., 194.

3) Ibid., 194.

4) Ibid., 195.

5) Ibid., 195-196.

6) Norman Geisler. Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1999), 327.

7) Ibid., 327.

⁸⁾ Ibid., 327.

9) Richard Whateley. Historical Doubts Concerning the Existence of Napoleon Bonapart.

10) Geisler. Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, 327.

11) Ibid., 327.

12) Geisler. Systematic Theology: Volume One. 199-200.

13) Geisler. Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, 328.

14) Geisler. Systematic Theology: Volume One. 201.

15) Geisler. Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, 328.

16) Geisler. Systematic Theology: Volume One. 201.