The Case For Christmas with Lee Strobel

Bryan is aware that Lee Strobel is not a King James Bible believer or a mid-Acts Dispensationalist. However, Bryan finds many of his apologetic arguments interesting and useful. Please enjoy these video clips from Lee Strobel's presentation on The Case For Christmas. Merry Christmas from the saints at Grace Life Bible Church.

What is History? A Response to Historical Relativism, Part 2

Note: This is part two of the article posted from last week.

Response to the Metaphysical (Worldview) Objections

While every historian has a worldview through which he interprets events, this reality alone does not render objective history impossible.

Response to the Problem of Arranging Materials

The past is not distorted simply because the historian must arrange his materials. Since neither the historian or the geologist was present for the original events, it is necessary to reconstruct the past based upon the available evidence. However, reconstruction does not automatically equate with revision. It is true that every historian needs to arrange his material, but this can occur without neglecting significant matters. As long as the historian incorporated consistently and comprehensively all the significant events in accordance with the way things really were, then objectivity would be lost.(1) Objectivity is distorted when facts are either neglected or twisted on purpose by the historian. Simply arranging materials does not undermine objectivity assuming it is done honestly.

Response to the Problem of Structuring Materials

"Those who argue against the objectivity of history apart from an overall worldview must be granted the point, for without a worldview it makes no sense to talk about objective meaning."(2) Without a context meaning cannot be determined, and context is provided by the worldview and not the mere facts themselves. All of this points to the necessity of establishing a worldview in order to achieve objectivity. Without a metaphysical structure, one is simply arguing in a circle regarding the assumed causal connection and the attributed importance of events.(3) To assert that facts have internal arrangement begs the question, "How does one know the correct arrangement?"

As we have already seen, since historical facts can be arranged in at least three ways (chaotic, cyclical, and linear), it is fallacious to assume that one of these structures is the way the facts should be arranged without the aid of an overriding worldview. Consequently, objective meaning in history cannot be established without appealing to a particular worldview for guidance.(4) If facts alone could produce objectivity the best they could do is provide only the what of history. But objective meaning deals with the why of these events, which is impossible apart from a structure of meaning in which the facts may find significance. Dr. Norman Geisler offers the following proof that objective meaning apart from worldview is impossible:

Nevertheless, granted that there is justification for adopting a theistic worldview, the objective meaning of history become possible, for within the theistic context each fact of history become a theistic fact. Given the factual order of events and the known causal connection of events, the possibility of objective meaning surfaces. The chaotic and cyclical frameworks are eliminated in favor of the linear, and within the linear view of events causal connections emerge as the result of their context in a theistic universe. Theism provides the sketch on which history paints the complete picture. The pigments of mere fact take on real meaning as they are blended together on the theistic sketch. In this context, objectivity means systematic consistency; that is, the most meaningful way all the facts of history can be blended together into the whole theistic sketch is what really happened—historical facts.(5)

Response to the Problem of Miracles

Despite having proven that objective history is possible, many historians object to any history that contains miracles, which is a problem for the Christian view of history. The famous skeptic David Hume wrote that no testimony about alleged miracles should be accepted if it contradicts the uniform testimony of nature.(6) If one defines a miracle as a special act of God, and God does exist, than miracles are possible. Therefore, any alleged historical paradigm that excludes miracles is faulty.(7) Second, Hume's assessment assumes a naturalistic interpretation of all historical events. Hume's is a methodological exclusion of the possibility of accepting miracles in history which in the end reaches too far.(8) According to Richard Whately, Hume's uniform dismissal of the possibility of miracles not only excludes the possibility of miracles but any unusual events from the past.(9)

For the purpose of illustration, consider the following regarding the career of Napoleon Bonaparte. There can be little doubt that the odds against Napoleon's success were extremely high:

His prodigious army was destroyed in Russia, and a few months later he led a different army in Germany that likewise was ruined at Leipzig. However, the French supplied him with yet another army sufficient to make a formidable stand in France—this was repeated five times until at last he was confined to an island.(10)

While no one doubts that this chain of events is highly improbable, there is no compelling reason to doubt the historicity of Napoleon's exploits. Contrary to scientific demands, history is not dependent upon universal and repeatable experimentation. Rather it stands on the sufficiency of good testimony for unrepeatable events. Likewise with miracles, it is an unjustifiable mistake in historical methodology to assume that no unusual and particular event can be believed no matter how great the evidence for it. An honest historian must be open to the possibility of unique and particular events in the past whether they are miracouls or not.(11)

While God is not currently working miracles during the Dispensation of Grace, miracles have happened in history but are not the result of history. This reality is consistent with a theistic worldview and does not subvert historical objectivity.

Response to the Psychological Objection

Critics of the New Testament constantly assert that the religious motivations of the Gospel writers cancel their ability to present an objective historical report. As we saw previously, the gospel writers are routinely accused of creating the words of Jesus in their own terms rather than simply reporting them. Dr. Geisler offers the following ten reasons for why this assertion is without foundation:

First, there is no logical connection between one's purpose and the accuracy of the history he writes. People with no religious motives can write bad history, and people with religious motives can write good history.

Second, other important writers from the ancient world wrote with motives similar to the Gospel authors. Plutarch (46 A.D.), for example declared, "My design was not to write histories, but lives."

Third, complete religious propaganda literature, such as some critics see the New Testament, was actually unknown in the ancient world.

Fourth, unlike other early accounts, the Gospels were written, at a maximum, only decades after the events. Many other secular writings, such as those of Livy (59/64 B.C.-A.D. 17) and Plutarch, were recorded centuries after the events.

Fifth, as shown above, the historical confirmation of New Testament writings is overwhelming. So the argument that their religious purpose destroyed their ability to write good history is simply contrary to the facts.

Sixth, the New Testament writes take great care to distinguish there words from the words of Christ. . . This act of distinguishing reveals their honest attempt to separate what Jesus actually said form their own thoughts and feelings on the mater.

Seventh, in spite of the religious purpose of Luke's gospel (Luke 1:4, Acts 1:1), he states a clear interest for historical accuracy, which has been overwhelming corroborated by archaeology (see Luke 1:1-4).

Eighth, the existence of religious bias is no guarantee of historical inaccuracy. A writer can recognize his own bias and avoid its crippling effects. If this were not so, then even people with nonreligious (or anit-religious) biases could not write accurate history.

Ninth, the New Testament is confirmed to be historical by the same criteria applied to other ancient writings. Thus, this criticism either misses the mark or else it destroys all ancient histories.

Tenth, if the historicity of an event must be denied because of the strong motivation of the person giving it, then virtually all eyewitness testimony from survivors of the holocaust must be discounted. But this is absurd, since these people provide the best evidence of all. Likewise, a physician's passion to save his patient's life does not negate his ability to make an objective diagnosis of his disease, nor do an author's religious motives nullify his ability to record accurate history.(12)

Response to the Hermeneutical Objection

There are several basic reasons why this argument completely fails to demonstrate that objective history is not possible.

The Relativity Argument Presupposes Some Objective Knowledge

There is a big difference between arguing about the interpretation of historical facts and quit asserting that there are no historical facts to argue about. Historical relativists presuppose objective knowledge while arguing that objective knowledge does not exist. First, in speaking about the need to select and arrange the facts of history, subjectivists imply that the facts represent objective knowledge in and of themselves.(13) Second, "the very fact that relativist believe one's worldview can distort how one views history implies that there is a correct way to view it."(14)

Total Historical Relativity is Self-Defeating

How does one know that history is completely unknowable without claiming to know something about it? How could one know that all historical knowledge was relative without possessing some objective knowledge of it? Having seen the logical end of relativism, some historians have hedged slightly by arguing that history is only partially relative. Once one opens the door to even partial objectivity, one cannot claim to have eliminated in principle the possibility that the Christian claims are historically knowable.(15) Moreover, partial relativism does not eliminate the historical verifiability of Christianity since there is more evidence for the central truths of Christianity than for almost any other event from the ancient world. In summation, total historical relativism is self-defeating, and partial historical relativism admits verifiable truths.(16)

Conclusion

The details of many other arguments against historical relativism could also be cited, but the core of these positions has already been examined and found wanting. These arguments include the following: historical relativists attempt objective history themselves, an ability to recognize bad history implies objective knowledge, and historians employ normal objective standards. Some may be wondering why we went through all the trouble to outline and respond to objections against the objectivity of history. Believers must always remember that Christianity is a historical faith that is built upon the historicity of Christ's life, ministry, crucifixion, and resurrection. As we said in the article entitled, The Importance of History to the Christian Worldview, our faith rises or falls based upon the historicity of the New Testament documents. As believers we need to be prepared to give a defense when our faith is skeptically challenged. We ought not to allow those who would reject the knowablity of history to thwart the defense and confirmation of the gospel. While charges of myth are often levied against the Christian view of history, these charges need not trip believers up. As we have demonstrated, history can be as objective as science.

Endnotes:

1) Norman Geisler. Systematic Theology: Volume One. (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany House, 2002), 194.

2) Ibid., 194.

3) Ibid., 194.

4) Ibid., 195.

5) Ibid., 195-196.

6) Norman Geisler. Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1999), 327.

7) Ibid., 327.

⁸⁾ Ibid., 327.

9) Richard Whateley. Historical Doubts Concerning the Existence of Napoleon Bonapart.

10) Geisler. Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, 327.

11) Ibid., 327.

12) Geisler. Systematic Theology: Volume One. 199-200.

13) Geisler. Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, 328.

14) Geisler. Systematic Theology: Volume One. 201.

15) Geisler. Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, 328.

16) Geisler. Systematic Theology: Volume One. 201.

 

What is History? Response to Historical Relativism Part 1

Over the past two weeks we have discussed the objections levied against the objectivity of history by the historical relativists. While the outlook for the knowability of history may look bleak at this point, the door is by no means shut on this question. Problems abound within the arguments postulated by historical subjectivists, and over the next two weeks we will focus our attention on answering the objections raised by the historical relativists. In the end, both the knowability of history and the historicity of Christianity will be vindicated.

Response to the Epistemological Objections

In seeking to deconstruct the assertions made by those who argue that history is not knowable an elementary mistake in reasoning becomes apparent. How can the relativist really know that everyone's knowledge of history is not objective unless one had an objective knowledge of it, by which they could determine that all other views were in fact not objective? As a result, it is not difficult to see that the basic premise of the relativist's entire argument is self-defeating. It does not pass its own standard for determining truth. One cannot claim that objective history is not possible without also asserting to have an objective knowledge of history.

Response to the Problem of Unobservability of Historical Events

How one defines the word objective is very important in answering those who doubt that history can be objectively known. If by objective one means absolute knowledge, then no human historian writing under his own power can be objective. However, if objective means an accurate and adequate presentation that reasonable men and women should accept, then the door is open to the possibility of objectivity.(1)

If one accepts the latter definition presented above, than history is no less objective than some of the other so-called empirical sciences. For example, paleontology or historical geology, a science which deals with physical facts and processes of the past, is widely considered one of the most objective of all the sciences.(2) This is somewhat curious since the events represented by the fossil record are no more observable or repeatable than historical events are for the historian. Dr. Norman Geisler offers the following assessment of the situation:

The fossil is a mechanically true imprint of the original event and the eyewitness of history may be less precise. But natural processes also can mar the fossil imprint. At least if one can determine the integrity and reliability of the eyewitness, one cannot slam the door on the possibility of objectivity in history any more than on objectivity in geology.(3)

A scientist might counter that the processes of the past can be repeated by experimentation in the present whereas historical events cannot. Once again this argument is not entirely correct since we have shown earlier that while God is advancing history forward in linear fashion towards its prophesied end, cyclical patters do occur along history's linear plane. Therefore, history does repeat itself to some degree. "In short, the historian no less that the scientist, has the tools for determining what really happened in the past. The lack of direct access does not hinder one more than the other."(4)

Finally, it should be noted if either the historian or the geologist takes "fact" to mean the original event than neither possess any facts. As a result, "fact" must be taken to mean information about the original event and as such they are not the subjective imaginations of the historian. Facts are objective data whether anyone reads them or not. Consequently, there remains both for science and history a sold core of objective facts because whatever meaning or interpretation one chooses to ascribe to the facts, the data is not eliminated. In fact, if there where no objective historical facts, one could not distinguish between good history and propaganda.(5) Geisler offers the following summation of this point:

If history is entirely in the mind of the beholder, there is no reason one cannot decide to behold it in any way he desires. In this case there would be no difference between good history and trashy propaganda. But historians, even historical subjectivists recognize the difference. Hence, even they assume an objective knowledge of history.(6)

Response to the Problem of Fragmentary Accounts

The fact that the historical record is fragmentary does not render history unknowable anymore than the fragmentary nature of the fossil record destroys the objectivity of geology. Fossils, like primary sources, represent only a small percentage of the history of all living things. However, this does not keep the geologist from reconstructing a picture of what happened in the past based upon the fossils available in the present. How is this different from the process of writing history? In fact, geologists have been known to reconstruct entire animals and people from only a single bone. One should not be quick to demand that every piece be present before reconstruction is attempted. If one possess key pieces of evidence reconstruction can occur with a measurable degree of probability.(7) "For example, by the principle of bilateral similarity one can assume that the left side of a partial skull would look like the right side that was found."(8)

Despite the recent controversy, history like science is subject to revision only if the discovery of new facts warrants a reinterpretation of events. New finds may provide new facts which call for new interpretations. Consequently, interpretations can neither create facts nor can they ignore them if they wish to remain objective. Therefore, one can conclude that history is not any less objective than geology simply because it depends upon fragmentary accounts.(9) "Scientific knowledge is also partial and depends upon assumptions and an overall framework which may prove to be inadequate upon the discovery of more facts."(10)

In conclusion to this point, consider the following summation by Dr. Geisler. He writes:

Whatever difficulty there may be, from a strictly scientific point of view, in filling the gaps between facts, once one has assumed a philosophical stance toward the world, the problem of objectivity in general is resolved. If there is a God, then the overall picture is already drawn; the facts of history will merely fill in the details of its meaning. If the universe is theistic, the artist's sketch is already known in advance; the detail and coloring will come only as all the facts of history are fit into the overall sketch known to be true from the theistic framework. In the same sense historical objectivity is most certainly possible within a given framework such as a theistic worldview. Objectivity resides in the view that best fits the facts consistently into an overall theistic system which is supported by good evidence.(11)

Response to the Axiological (Value) Objection

Just because everyday language is laden with value judgments does not automatically eliminate the possibility of writing objective history. Objectivity means to be fair in how one deals with the facts; it means to present what occurred in the past as accurately as possible. Furthermore, objectivity means that when the historian interprets why events unfolded as they did, language should ascribe to these events that value they had in their original context. When this is accomplished objectivity is achieved. When viewed in this fashion, historical objectivity demands the making of value judgments. The real question here is not whether value language can be objective but rather whether value statements objectively portray the events the way they really occurred.(12) According to Geisler, "Once the worldview has been determined, value judgments are not undesirable or merely subjective; they are, in fact, essential and objectively required. If this is a theistic world, then it is not objective to place anything but a proper theistic value on the facts of history."(13)

Response to the Methodological Objections

Historical objectivity is not canceled out simply because every historian must employ a methodology when composing history.

Response to the Problem of Historical Conditioning

Every human being does occupy a relative place in the changing events of the spatio-temporal world. As a result, in at least a limited sense, each historian is a product of his time. However, it does not follow that because the historian is a product of his time; his history is also purely a product of the time. Just because a person cannot avoid their relative place in history does not mean they cannot achieve a meaningful degree of objectivity. This objection confuses the content of knowledge and the process one uses in attaining it.(14)

Moreover, if relativity were inevitable, historical relativism is self-defeating, because this view would either be historically conditioned and therefore unobjective or it is not relative but objective. If the latter is correct, the historical relativist must admit that objective history is possible. On the other hand, "if the position of the historical relativism is itself relative, it cannot be taken as objectively true—it is simply subjective opinion."(15) In summary, "if it is a subjective opinion it cannot eliminate the possibility that history is objectively knowable, and if it is an objective fact about history, then objective facts can be now about history."(16) The bottom line is that objectivity is possible, if the first seneario is true objectivity is not eliminated and in the second relativism is self-defeated.(17)

In the end, is not the constant historical revisionism undertaken by modern historian predicated on the assumption that objectivity is possible? In short, there is no basis for doubting the possibility of a high degree of historical objectivity.

Response to the Problem of Selectivity of Materials

Every day in the United States jurors make judgments about the guilt or innocence of their fellow citizens "beyond reasonable doubt" without having all the evidence. One need not know everything in order to know something. No scientist possesses all the facts yet objectivity is routinely claim and applauded. As long as the historian considers the relevant and critical evidence without overlooking important facts, history is no less objective than science. What is necessary is that facts be selected and reconstructed within the context in which the events represented actually transpired. Selectivity is necessary because no historian can account for everything available on a particular subject. As a result, selectivity does not imply distortion.(18)

In the end, since the evidence for the historicity of the New Testament is greater than for any other document from antiquity, it could easily be argued that if the events recorded in Scripture cannot be objectively known, then it is impossible to know anything else from that time period.(19)

Endnotes:

1. Norman Geisler. Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1999), 323.
   
2. Ibid., 323.
   
3. Ibid., 324.
   
4. Norman Geisler. Systematic Theology: Volume One. (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany House, 2002), 190.
   
5. Ibid., 190-191.
   
6. Ibid., 191.
   
7. Ibid., 191.
   
8. Ibid., 191.    
   
9. Geisler. Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, 324.
   
10. Ibid., 324.
    
11. Ibid., 325.
    
12. Geisler. Systematic Theology: Volume One, 192.
    
13. Ibid., 192.
    
14. Ibid., 192.
    
15. Ibid., 193.
    
16. Ibid., 193.
    
17. Ibid., 193.
    
18. Ibid., 193.
    
19. Ibid., 193.
    

 

What is History? Objections to the Objectivity of History Part 2

Previously, we examined the objections to the objectivity of history raised by historical relativists. Epistemological, axiological, and methodological objections were explored in last week’s posting. This week, attention will be given to three other types of objections: metaphysical, psychological, and hermeneutical.

The Metaphysical (Worldview) Objections

Simply stated, the various metaphysical objections to the objectivity of history steam from the notion that one’s worldview colors his perspective of the past.

The Need to Structure the Facts of History

One of the epistemological objections we studied last week dealt with the fragmentary nature of existing historical documents. For the historical subjectivist, this observation leads to the conclusion that our partial knowledge of the past necessitates that we to fill in the gaps or connect the dots between events with our own imagination. Dr. Norman Geisler illustrates this criticism by comparing it with a connect the dot game often found in children’s activity books. Just as the child starts with dot number one and draws lines connecting each dot, thereby rendering a complete image, so too does the historian. However, unlike the child’s activity historians utilize only their imagination in connecting the fragmentary facts, according to historical relativists.(1)

Second, historical subjectivists make a distinction between a chronicle and history. A chronicle is the unrefined source material used by historians to construct history. Here in lies the problem according to the relativist-the historian is not content to tell his readers what happened but feels compelled to explain why it happened. As one might expect, relativists argue that these connective explanations are influenced by the worldview of the historian and therefore are not objective.(2)

The Unavoidability of Worldviews

The second metaphysical objection is similar to the first. Objectivity is compromised because every historian interprets the past within the framework of his own worldview. As discussed in a previous posting there are only three philosophies of history from which the historian can choose, chaotic, cyclical, and linear. Relativists charge that facts occupy a secondary role compared to the philosophy of history chosen by the historian. Rather, one’s faith and philosophical preferences skew their choice of philosophical paradigm. Facts therefore are not allowed to speak for themselves but are given voice based upon the worldview of the historian.(3) Consequently, “if there are several different ways to interpret the same facts, depending on the overall perspective one takes, then there is no single objective interpretation of history.”(4)

The Problem of Miracles

“Even if one grants that secular history could be known objectively, there still remains the problem of the subjectivity of religious history.”(5) Subjectivists argue that since miracles are supernatural there is no way to objectively verify them. This, of course, presents a potential problem for Bible believers because scripture records many miracles including the resurrection of Christ as historical facts. According to relativists, spiritual history has no connection with the spatiotemporal continuum of empirical events, thereby relegating miracles to the category of myths. As a result, any worldview which accepts miracles as valid would render history written from that vantage point not objective. Therefore, relativists argue that “the historian, like the scientist must adopt a methodological skepticism toward all alleged events in the past for which he has not parallel in the present—the present is the foundation of our knowledge of the past.”(6)

The Psychological Objection

At this point the attentive reader has no doubt noticed similarities among the arguments asserted against the knowability of history. The psychological objection is no exception. This argument is once against biased against anyone writing history from a religious point of view. In simple terms, the psychological objection asserts that history written by persons with religious motives cannot be trusted because their religious passions obscure their objectivity. Supporters of this position will commonly say that the New Testament writers cannot be trusted because they sought to recreate what Jesus said and not simply report His sayings. As a result, the Gospels are more reflective of the experiences of Christians than they are an accurate recording to the words and life of Jesus.(7)

The Hermeneutical Objection

In his book, Metahistory, author Hayden White claims that history is poetry. According to this view, history should be treated in the same manner as any other piece of literature. White argues that no history can be written apart from some unifying concept which can only be chosen from one of the following archetypal plot structures: romance, tragedy, comedy, or satire. Since one of these poetic plot structures is not better than the others but merely different, White views all debate about how history should be written as a matter of stylistic variation thereby rendering the entire discussion of historical objectivity moot.(8)

All the objections considered in the last two articles have one thing in common-they all seek to overthrow Christianity by challenging the validly of the faith’s historical underpinnings. Next week, we will begin to present a defense for the objectivity of history against its detractors.

Endnotes:

1)Normal Geisler. Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1999), 322.
2)Ibid., 322.
3)Norman Geisler. Systematic Theology Volume One. (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany House, 2002), 186.
4)Ibid., 187.
5)Ibid., 187.
6)Ibid, 188.
7)Ibid., 188-189.
8)Hayden White. Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-CenturyEurope. 41-42.